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  1Abstract 
 
The issue of why productivity growth during the British industrial revolution was slow 
despite the arrival of famous inventions is revisited using a growth accounting methodology 
based on an endogenous innovation model and the perspective of recent literature on general 
purpose technologies.  The results show that steam had a relatively small and long-delayed 
impact on productivity growth when benchmarked against later technologies such as 
electricity or ICT.  Even so, technological change including embodiment effects accounted 
entirely for the acceleration in labor productivity growth that allowed the economy to 







  2Growth accounting has played an important role in the reassessment of British economic 
growth during the industrial revolution and the emergence of the Crafts-Harley view.
1  The 
results obtained in recent analyses have suggested that total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
was quite modest in the decades following the cluster of major inventions (steam engine, 
spinning mule, puddling etc.) that are identified with the onset of faster industrial growth and 
much less in the early nineteenth century than was once believed. 
 
Table 1 summarizes developments in growth accounting estimates for the industrial 
revolution period.  The change implied by the Crafts-Harley view can be seen in the 
difference between Feinstein's early results based on older national income data and those of 
Crafts based on the newer estimates.  The estimates by Antras and Voth confirm that the 
Crafts-Harley revisions are plausible using an independent procedure based on the price dual 
approach to TFP measurement. 
 
Mokyr has pointed out the implications of the revised TFP growth estimates as follows. "The 
apparent dominance of invention over abstention, one of the most striking findings of the 
New Economic History, seems less secure now than it did a decade ago. Clearly it is 
unwarranted to expect that major technological breakthroughs will lead to more or less 
simultaneous increases in productivity."
2 
 
How can one reconcile slow macroeconomic TFP growth with spectacularly successful 
microeconomic innovations in several important industrial sectors such as cotton textiles and 
the iron industry?  At one level an answer is provided by the disaggregated growth 
accounting results put forward by Harley which suggest that much of the economy, notably 




At another level of explanation, recourse might be had to the recent literature on General 
Purpose Technologies (GPTs).
4  A GPT can be defined as "a technology that initially has 
much scope for improvement and eventually comes to be widely used, to have many uses, 
and to have many Hicksian and technological complementarities".
5  Electricity, steam, and 
information and communications technology (ICT) are usually seen as among the most 
important examples.  Clearly, it is to be expected that a new GPT will have a substantial 
positive impact on the rate of TFP growth.  However, a key theme of these models of 
economic growth is that the initial impact of a GPT is either negligible or even possibly 
negative and that the delay before TFP growth rises appreciably may be considerable.  Thus, 
productivity growth in the industrial revolution may have benefited very little from the 
arrival of steam power until relatively late in the day. 
 
These arguments acquire some credibility when the results of a separate stream of research 
into the social savings of technological change are recalled.  Von Tunzelmann estimated that, 
if James Watt had not invented the improved steam engine in 1769, the national income of 
Great Britain in 1800 would have been reduced by only about 0.1 per cent.
6  Similarly, 
Hawke found that the social savings of railways in England and Wales in 1850 amounted to 
£9.7 million when the British gross domestic product was £523 million.
7  The later US 
experience of electricity also lends support.  While the excitement of the electrical age 
arrived in the 1880s, the main (very substantial) productivity impact came only in the 1920s 
when the possibilities for re-design of the factory were realized.
8 
 
  4Alternatively, perhaps more attention should be given to the choice of growth accounting 
methodology.  In particular, the development of endogenous growth theory may be thought to 
imply that the traditional growth accounting techniques based on the neoclassical (Solow) 
growth model are no longer appropriate.  This view has been put forward by Greasley and 
Oxley whose results are also reported in Table 1.  Their approach, based on assuming two 
factors of production (capital and human capital) which together comprise 'broad capital', 
leads them to conclude that it "support[s] the endogenous model by removing the need for 
TFP to play a substantive role in industrial revolution growth".
9  This is clearly not a way to 
rehabilitate rapid technological change or 'ingenuity rather than abstention' as the central 
theme of the industrial revolution. 
 
The methodology proposed by Greasley and Oxley does not, however, adequately reflect the 
new growth economics and assumes a production function that has no empirical 
justification.
10  Moreover, their results imply an astonishing rate of return to very modest 
increases in formal schooling, as is demonstrated in calculations made by Mitch.
11  While the 
Greasley and Oxley attempt to revise growth accounting should not be taken seriously, there 
are other, more promising, possibilities to be explored. 
 
Barro has set out a method based on an endogenous innovation model of economic growth. 
This approach does not seek to abolish TFP growth but rather argues that measured TFP 
growth generally underestimates the contribution made by technological change to growth.
12  
It attributes a larger proportion of growth to innovation by taking explicit account of its 
embodiment in new varieties of capital goods and might well be regarded as an appropriate 
way to address the impact of the new technologies of the industrial revolution, a time famous 
for new machines.  As Feinstein put it, "many forms of technological advance ... can only 
  5take effect when 'embodied' in new capital goods.  The spinning jennies, steam engines, and 
blast furnaces were the 'embodiment' of the industrial revolution".
13  Growth accounting 
along these lines has already been widely used to investigate the impact of ICT, the new 
GPT, on late twentieth century American economic growth.
14  These studies all seek to 
capture the growth contribution of ICT by estimating components based on ICT capital in use 
as well as TFP growth. 
 
In the light of this discussion, this paper re-examines the TFP growth paradox of the British 
industrial revolution using a revised growth accounting methodology similar to those 
featured in the recent literature on ICT.  This will permit not only a reappraisal of the growth 
contribution of technological change but also an assessment of the role played by steam as a 
GPT. 
 
GROWTH ACCOUNTING METHODOLOGY 
 
The traditional neoclassical growth accounting methodology captures a contribution to 
growth from exogenous technological change in the Solow residual estimate of TFP growth.  
With the standard Cobb-Douglas production function and competitive assumptions 
 
         Y  =  AK
αL
1 − α                                                                                                          (1) 
 
the Solow residual is computed as 
 
         ∆A/A  =  ∆Y/Y  −  sK∆K/K  −  sL∆L/L                                                                     (2) 
 
  6where sK and sL are the factor income shares of capital and labor respectively.  Variants of 
this approach, including the price dual technique, have been the standard method of 
estimating the contribution of technological change to growth during the British industrial 
revolution, as was reported in Table 1.  Equation (2) can be converted to an expression that 
accounts for growth of labor productivity as follows: 
 
         ∆(Y/L)/(Y/L)  =  sK∆(K/L)/(K/L)   +  ∆A/A                                                              (3) 
 
Growth accounting techniques are, however, based on models of economic growth and, in 
particular, are derived from the specification of the aggregate production function.  If an 
endogenous growth model is assumed, the contribution of technological change will not 
generally be equal to the Solow residual.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin formulate a version of an 
endogenous innovation growth model which illustrates this point and is also a useful tool for 
reappraisal of growth during the industrial revolution.
15  In their specification 
 
         Y  =  AL
1 − αNK
α                                                                                                        (4) 
 
where N is the number of varieties of capital goods each of which in equilibrium is employed 
at the same level and can be measured in a common unit.  This can be written as 
 
         Y  =  AL
1 −  α(NK)
αN
1 − α                                                                                             (5) 
 
where (NK) is the aggregate flow of capital services.  Equation (5) implies that diminishing 
returns set in when K increases for given N but not when N rises for given K.  Therefore 
  7technological progress in the form of continuing increases in N can provide the basis for 
endogenous growth. 
 
The formula for output growth based on equation (5) is 
 
         ∆Y/Y  =  ∆A/A  +  (1 − α)∆N/N  +  sL∆L/L  +  sK(∆N/N  +  ∆K/K)                        (6) 
 
where the standard computation for TFP gives ∆A/A  +  (1 − α)∆N/N. 
 
Thus part of the contribution of technological change, i.e., α∆N/N, is attributed to capital.  
On these assumptions, TFP growth underestimates the impact of technological change on 
growth. 
 
A variant of this approach has been adopted by practitioners in the literature on the role of 
ICT in economic growth.  Thus Oliner and Sichel identified the contribution of innovations in 
ICT to growth of labor productivity as coming through three types of ICT capital deepening 
(computer hardware, software and communication equipment) weighted by the shares of 
these types of capital in income and through TFP growth in ICT production weighted by its 
share in gross output 
16  Oliner and Sichel's results are summarized in Table 2 which is useful 
both to illustrate this method of growth accounting and as a benchmark against which steam 
can be compared.  For this latter purpose it may be that the period prior to the mid-1990s is 
the most relevant since 1996-9 is perhaps seriously affected by cyclical influences. 
 
The results reported in Table 2 can be summarized for our purposes as follows.  The total 
contribution of ICT to labor productivity growth is estimated to have been 0.61 percentage 
  8points per year from 1974-90 and 0.74 in 1991-5.  In each case the larger part accrues from 
capital deepening rather than TFP growth.  It is noticeable that the capital income and output 
shares are both small even at the end of the 1990s but rise over time.  This restrains ICT's 
initial impact notwithstanding sustained double digit annual growth rates both of ICT capital 
stock and of TFP in ICT production. 
 
The model assumed by Oliner and Sichel and thus the estimates in Table 2 may not, however, 
do full justice to ICT as a GPT.  Another strand of endogenous growth theory posits spillover 
effects on TFP elsewhere in the economy through technological complementarities, as in the 
case of electricity and factory design in the 1920s.
17  It is widely claimed that TFP spillovers 
from ICT started to materalize in the later 1990s (through reorganization effects in particular) 
but at present there exist no quantitative estimates of their macroeconomic impact.
18 
 
New economic historians traditionally measured the contribution of a new technology to 
economic growth using the concept of social savings.  This was most famously applied to the 
impact of the railroad in many countries by authors following the methodology developed by 
Fishlow and Fogel.
19  The social saving is usually computed as an upper bound measure of 
the gain in consumer surplus from the fall in costs allowed by the new technology. In the case 
of railroads the alternative might be canal transport.  Thus: 
 
         SS  =  (pW  −  pR)qR                                                                                                   (7) 
 
where SS is social saving, pW and pR are the prices charged for water and rail transport, 
respectively, and qR is the quantity transported by rail in the year of observation. 
 
  9If demand is not perfectly price inelastic this is, of course, an overestimate of the true social 
saving.  If perfect competition prevails in the transport industry, the social saving is also 
equal to the total resource cost saving and if, in addition, the rest of the economy is also 
perfectly competitive throughout, then the transport benefit is also equal to the gain in real 
income.
20  This is the interpretation that Fogel gave to the social saving.
21 
 
Harberger reminded us that TFP growth can be interpreted as real cost reduction and the 
price dual measure of TFP confirms that the fall over time in the real cost of railroad 
transport under competitive conditions is also equal to TFP growth.
22  Since railroads will 
only be introduced at the point where they can offer transport at the same cost as canals, the 
social saving measure should approximate to the railroad TFP contribution in a growth 
accounting exercise of the Oliner and Sichel type, provided the same volume of output is 
chosen to compute the estimate.  Indeed, this equivalence is exactly how Foreman-Peck 
extended Hawke's social savings estimate for British railways to 1890.
23 
 
The price dual measure of TFP growth equivalent to (2) is 
 
         ∆A/A  =  sK∆r/r  +  sL∆w/w  −  ∆p/p                                                                        (8) 
 
where r is the profit rate, w is the wage rate and p is output price.  Thus, when input prices 
are constant, TFP growth equals the rate of price decline. 
 
Using this result, the rail social saving in year t compared with the year of introduction, t − 1, 
expressed as a fraction of rail revenue is 
 
  10         (pt − 1  −  pt)qt/ptqt   =   pt − 1/pt  −  1   =   At/At − 1  −  1                                                 (9) 
 
or expressed as a fraction of GDP is 
 
         (At/At − 1  −  1)*(ptqt/GDPt)                                                                                      (10) 
 
Rail social savings as a proportion of GDP are revealed to be the percentage change in TFP 
in the rail industry multiplied by the ratio of rail output to GDP. 
 
The social saving approach is then equivalent to taking only the TFP and not the capital 
contribution of an innovation.  The logic of this is quite clear in terms of Fogel's search for 
the indispensable element that railroads gave to the economy and his desire to kill the myth 
of indispensability.  Railroad capital earned a normal profit equal to its opportunity cost.  If 
the capital were not invested in railroads, it would be invested in something else that would 
deliver an equal return. 
 
Growth accounting attempts to measure the realised results of investment that has taken place 
and addresses the question 'how much did the new technology contribute?' rather than the 
question 'how much more did it contribute than an alternative investment might have yielded 
?' which is the focus of the social saving.  In addition, the new growth accounting is based on 
an endogenous innovation growth model in which new technology is embodied in capital 
equipment.  The implicit assumption is that, in the absence of the innovation, the economy 
would both have a lower TFP growth rate and a quantity of capital lower by the whole 
amount of the new capital goods in which the technology is embodied. 
 
  11It seems likely that many economists would instinctively believe in models that would imply 
answers somewhere between the growth accounting and social savings methodologies. Thus 
some would consider at the macro-level that investments of the size typically made in major 
new technologies could not have been made in alternative projects without depressing the 
rate of return at least somewhat, while others will predict that the adoption of new 
technologies precipitates the exit of some old capital goods that would have survived.  Thus, 
it will be useful to have both standards of comparison available as benchmarks. 
 
Had the relationship between the social savings and TFP growth as measured by traditional 
growth accounting been more widely recognized, it seems likely that the TFP growth 
findings of the Crafts-Harley view would have been anticipated.  Given that major 
innovations such as the steam engine and the railway had rather modest social savings, it 
should have been no great surprise that aggregate TFP growth was not very fast. 
 
GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
 
This section seeks to implement the Oliner and Sichel growth accounting framework for 
steam during the British industrial revolution.  The analysis will rely heavily on early work in 
cliometrics and will convert the social savings estimates of those days into a growth 
accounting format.  It will also, however, provide estimates of the impact of steam capital-
deepening on labor productivity growth. 
 
Table 3 reports the results of a compilation of information from existing studies on the impact 
of stationary steam engines used in industry and of railways (a sector wholly dependent on 
steam power) into a growth accounting format comparable with that for ICT in Table 2.  The 
  12data on steam engines is incomplete, especially for the period between 1800 when Watt's 
patents expired and 1838 when the first returns under the Factory Acts were made. 
Nevertheless, there is general agreement on the broad picture of the use of steam power.  In 
1800 there were about 35,000 and in 1830 about 160,000 steam horsepower and even in 1870 
only about 1.7 million steam horsepower were in use, representing about 2.5 per cent of the 
capital stock.
24  Steam power was intensively used in textiles, the iron industry and coal 
mining but important sectors of the economy including agriculture and the tertiary sector 
outside of transport were virtually untouched by it.
25  For a very long time water power 
remained cheaper for most users.
26  Thus the capital deepening contribution reported in Table 
3 is quite small. 
 
Although Watt's steam engine represented an important advance, from 1800 to about 1840 
there was little further advance and the capital costs of steam engines did not fall − there was 
no equivalent to Moore's Law in operation then.
27  There followed a period of further 
advance; many steam engines were upgraded to work at higher pressures and the price of 
steam power to the user had approximately halved by the mid-1850s.
28  Insofar as this 
represented an upgrading in quality in the steam engine, it is (imperfectly) captured in the 
data which after 1860 are for 'indicated' horsepower.  There are, however, no hedonic prices 
for steam engines with which to refine the capital-deepening estimate.
29 
 
Table 3 shows that steam's impact on labor productivity growth was less than 0.01 percentage 
points throughout the period 1760-1830 with a negligible role for TFP growth.  An 
appreciable contribution to growth from steam only came during the railway age which is 
conventionally dated from the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 1830.  A 
massive investment in railway construction ensued although the profits obtained were quite 
  13modest.  Railway technology developed rapidly but the social savings estimates of Hawke, 
whose results are incorporated in Table 3, translate into a TFP contribution to raising overall 
labor productivity of only 0.05 percentage points per year in the period 1830-60.  Even with 
the capital-deepening component, steam’s contribution to labor productivity growth in these 
years was only 0.24 percentage points per year. 
 
Table 3 includes estimates of the contribution from capital deepening and own TFP growth 
but does not, however, include any estimate of TFP spillovers from steam.  With regard to 
railways, this was considered very explicitly in the social savings calculation made by Hawke 
who firmly rejected the notion that these were important.
30  The chief underpinning for this 
finding is that railways seem to have had very little impact on location decisions in the mid 
nineteenth century in an economy which had already adapted to canals. 
 
Where the steam engine is concerned, the situation is more complicated.  Von Tunzelmann 
examined the impact of steam power on technological progress in the textile industries where 
the main effects were most likely to be found.  He noted that all the famous advances of the 
industrial revolution period were originally developed for other forms of power; if there were 
important technological complementarities, he suggested that they only came late in the day, 
in the period 1847 to 1860.
31  This suggests that over the whole period, 1780-1860, any such 
contribution to the average annual productivity growth rate would have been very small. 
 
Table 3 shows evidence of the classic GPT phasing of productivity growth effects but with a 
very elongated first negligible-impact phase and a modest growth contribution even after 
1830.  It may be that to find the strongest impact of steam on growth would require research 
into a later period when steam horsepower rose from under 2 million in 1870 to 9.65 million 
  14in 1907 and when steam's contributions to globalization through transport cost reductions 
were considerable.
32  Taken at face value, these results suggest that slow TFP growth during 
the industrial revolution, especially prior to 1830, can be understood to a large extent in terms 
of the weakness of the productivity contribution of the most prominent GPT of the day, 
steam.  This should not be a surprise to anyone familiar with the early cliometrics literature 




The most celebrated instance of a delayed productivity impact from a GPT is the case of 
electricity which was highlighted in a much-cited paper by David who stressed that its big 
impact on productivity did not materialize until the 1920s.
34  Table 4 facilitates comparison 
of these episodes by providing a new growth accounting estimate of electricity's contribution 
to productivity growth in early twentieth century America.  The estimate is that electricity 
raised the growth rate of labor productivity by an average of 0.54 percentage points over the 
period 1899-1929 – well above the 0.24 percentage points from steam in 1830-60 − with a 
sizeable contribution from TFP spillovers in the switch in the factory from shafts to wires.  
This exercise shows that the productivity gains from electricity actually came rather quickly 
compared with its predecessor technology, steam.  Indeed the picture that emerges from 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 taken together is that the waiting time for a significant labor productivity 
payoff from the new GPT has fallen over time. 
 
An alternative way to implement endogenous innovation growth accounting for the industrial 
revolution is to consider the 'modernized sectors' (cottons, woolens, iron, canals, ships, 
railways) as defined by Harley, who provides estimates of their contribution to TFP growth 
for the period 1780-1860 using gross output weights.
35  This would allow a rather broader 
  15view of the role played by GPTs in the British industrial revolution, in particular capturing 
the impact of the adoption of the factory system which, it has been argued, should be 
considered as a GPT.
36  At the same time, taking into account all these sectors will very 
largely subsume the contribution of steam including any TFP spillovers, although these will 
not be able to be measured separately.  Capital stock data for the modernized sectors to 
supplement Harley's TFP growth estimates with capital-deepening contributions to labor 
productivity are reported in Table 5. 
 
Table 6 displays the results of this new growth accounting exercise.  The modernized sectors 
are found to have contributed 0.46 out of 0.78 per cent per year growth in labor productivity 
with the majority of this, 0.34 compared with 0.12 per cent, coming from TFP growth as 
opposed to capital deepening.  If the contribution of technological change to the growth of 
labor productivity is taken to be capital deepening in the modernized sectors plus total TFP 
growth, then this equates to 0.68 out of 0.78 per cent. 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
 
In the light of these results, it is now appropriate to review the TFP growth paradox of the 
industrial revolution.  The preceding section can help to clarify why famous technological 
breakthroughs had a relatively limited impact on productivity growth.  The explicit account 
taken of the embodiment of new technologies in capital goods also leads to a somewhat 
revised estimate of the role of technological change in the growth outcomes of the period. 
 
The evidence on the productivity impact of steam reveals both that it was slow to materialize 
and that, at least prior to 1860, it was weak by comparison with other GPTs usually spoken of 
  16in the same breath, electricity and ICT.  The real price of steam power stayed high for many 
decades and, consequently, the build up of steam horsepower was very gradual with only 
160,000 horsepower in use in 1830.  At this time for most of the economy steam was 
irrelevant.  Even in textiles, which came to predominate in the use of steam by the mid-
nineteenth century, water power was cheaper in most of the industry until the 1830s.
37TFP 
growth attributable to steam, even including railways, through to 1860 was much smaller 
than would later accrue from electricity or ICT at similar stages of their development. 
 
Taken together with the confirmation of the dual estimates of Antras and Voth (reported in 
Table 1) that overall TFP growth was not fast enough to allow a substantial role for TFP 
growth in the rest of the economy beyond the modernized sectors and agriculture, the limited 
applicability of steam power in the classic industrial revolution period indicates that 
productivity growth did not take the form of a yeast like process.
38 
 
The social savings literature informed us a long time ago that even spectacular innovations 
like the railroad have small initial implications for growth.  In a growth accounting context 
the fundamental reason for this becomes apparent.  In the first phase of the new technology 
its output weight relative to GDP is so small that it cannot make a great deal of difference to 
overall TFP growth.  If the capital-deepening contribution of embodied technological 
progress is also taken into account, this conclusion is modified somewhat but not overturned.   
 
With traditional growth accounting, as in Table 1, TFP growth accounts for a little over a 
quarter of the growth of GDP between 1780 and 1860 (0.56/2.0 percentage points).
39Taking 
the view that the contribution of the growth in the modernized sector's capital stock at 3.21 
per cent per year in Table 5 should be added to this because it represents the embodiment of 
  17new technologies would raise the estimate of the contribution of technological change by 
(3.21 x 0.059)  =  0.19 percentage points to a combined total of 0.75/2.0 = 37.5 per cent. This 
would still be well short of the share of about a half that was the basis of McCloskey's claim 
that "ingenuity rather than abstention governed the industrial revolution".
40 
 
This is not, however, the most informative way to look at growth during the industrial 
revolution.  The great achievement of the British economy was to raise labor productivity 
(and sustain living standards) in the face of demographic pressure that in earlier centuries 
would have depressed output per worker.  When traditional growth accounting is applied to 
the growth of labor productivity, Table 6 shows that between 1780 and 1860 TFP growth was 
responsible for over 70 percent (0.56/0.78 percentage points).  If the embodiment hypothesis 
is added to this, then the contribution of technological change rises to 0.56 + 0.12 = 0.68 out 
of 0.78 percentage points, i. e., 87 per cent. 
 
Or put another way, the increase in labor productivity growth after 1780 was a little under 0.5 
percentage points per year compared with the period 1700 to 1780.  This is much the same as 
the contribution of the modernized sectors according to Table 6.  It remains perfectly 
feasible, therefore, to regard technological innovation as responsible for the acceleration in 





The method of growth accounting used by applied economists to examine contemporary 
productivity performance has changed.  In the wake of the new growth theory, it seems 
  18appropriate to take explicit account of the embodiment of technological change in new 
varieties of capital goods.  This approach meets a need frequently expressed by economic 
historians and appears quite suitable for analyzing the episode of the industrial revolution. 
 
Moving from traditional to new growth accounting raises the estimated contribution of 
improvements in technology to British economic growth in the period 1780 to 1860 but not 
greatly.  In terms of growth of GDP the estimated share of technological change rises from a 
little over a quarter to three-eighths while in terms of labor productivity the increase is from 
just over 70 per cent to seven-eighths. 
 
Viewing the industrial revolution through the lens of the literature on General Purpose 
Technologies is also helpful.  This predicts that the early years of a GPT will see little or no 
impact on aggregate productivity growth.  In the industrial revolution the contribution of 
steam power to the macroeconomy amply bears out this prediction even when capital 
deepening is included along with TFP growth.  Indeed, benchmarked in terms of other GPTs 
such as electricity and ICT, steam is seen to have had a relatively small and long-delayed 
effect on the growth rate of labor productivity.  To a considerable extent, unspectacular 
productivity advance during the industrial revolution can be understood in terms of the rather 
weak impact of steam as a GPT. 
 
This finding is not surprising when the results of early cliometricians' research into the social 
savings of steam-based innovations are recalled. However, it should be noted that whether 
the benchmark is set in terms of TFP growth alone (as it would be on the Fogel yardstick) or 
TFP growth and capital-deepening (as on the Oliner and Sichel measure) steam delivered 
much less, much later than either electricity or ICT. 
  19 
  20Table 1. Accounting for Growth During the British Industrial Revolution (% per year) 
 
                                                                           Contributions from 
  Output  Capital Stock  Labor Force  TFP 
  Growth Growth Growth  
C r a f t s      
1760-80  0.6  0.25 0.35 0.0 
1780-1831 1.7  0.60 0.80 0.3 
1831-73  2.4  0.90 0.75 0.75 
F e i n s t e i n       
1761-1800  1.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 
1801-30  2.7 0.7 0.7 1.3 
1831-60  2.5 1.0 0.7 0.8 
 
                                                                           Contributions from 
  Output  Capital Stock  Human Capital  TFP 
  Growth Growth Stock  Growth   
Greasley  &  Oxley      
1760-80  0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 
1780-1831  1.7 0.6 1.1 0.0 
1831-73  2.4 0.9 1.7 -0.2 
 
                                                          Contributions from 
 Capital  Labor  Land  TFP 
  Income Income Income  
Antras  &  Voth      
1770-1801  -0.1  0.2 0.0 0.1 
1801-31  0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 
1831-60  0.3 0.3 0.0 0.6 
 
Notes: weights: Crafts: capital 0.4, labor 0.6; Feinstein: capital 0.5, labor 0.5; Greasley and 
Oxley: capital 0.4, human capital 0.6; Antras and Voth: capital 0.35, labor 0.5, land 0.15. 
Sources: Crafts, "Exogenous or Endogenous Growth," p. 752; Feinstein, "Capital 
Accumulation," p. 139, 141; Greasley and Oxley, "Endogenous Growth," p. 943; Antras and 
Voth, "Productivity Growth," p. 16. 
  21Table 2.  Contributions to Labor Productivity Growth in US Non-Farm Business 
Sector, 1974-99 (% per year) 
 
 
 1974-90  1991-5  1996-9 
      
Capital Deepening  0.81  0.62  1.10 
      ICT Capital  0.44  0.51  0.96 
      Other  0.37  0.11  0.14 
      
Total Factor Productivity  0.33  0.48  1.16 
      ICT Sector  0.17  0.23  0.49 
      Other  0.16  0.25  0.67 
      
Labor Quality  0.22  0.44  0.31 
      
Labor Productivity Growth  1.37  1.53  2.57 
      
Memorandum Items       
      ICT Capital Income Share (%)  3.3  5.3  6.3 
      ICT Sector Output Share (%)  1.4  1.9  2.5 
 
Source: derived from Oliner and Sichel, "Resurgence", p. 10, 13, and 17  
 




 1760-1800  1800-30  1830-60 
      
Steam Engine Capital Stock Growth  4.3  3.9  4.9 
Income Share (%)  0.1  0.2  0.7 
   Steam Power Capital Deepening  0.004  0.008  0.03 
Steam Engine TFP Growth  6.7  0.0  3.4 
Output Share (%)  0.04  0.1  0.3 
   Steam Power TFP  0.003  0.00  0.01 
      
Railway Capital Stock Growth      16.2 
Income Share (%)      0.9 
   Railway Capital Deepening      0.15 
Railway TFP Growth      3.5 
Output Share (%)      1.4 
   Railway TFP      0.05 
      
Total Steam  0.004  0.008  0.24 
 
Sources: 
Steam power: capital stock growth proxied by horsepower, for 1760-1830 from Kanefsky, 
"Diffusion," p.338, for 1860 the average of estimates for 1850 in Musson, " Industrial Motive 
Power," p. 435, and for 1870 in Kanefsky, " Motive Power," p.373 with the 1850 estimate 
corrected in line with Kanefsky's criticisms; TFP growth in steam power based on von 
Tunzelmann, Steam Power, p. 74, 149-50 based on social savings of Watt engines for 1800 
and subsequent trends in the real cost of steam power.  Steam engine share assumed 
proportional to share of total capital stock in Feinstein, "National Statistics," p. 433 based on 
total capital costs of steam power in von Tunzelmann, Steam Power with 1835 estimate 
reduced by 20 per cent for 1860 based on Blaug, "Productivity," p. 372.  Gross output shares 
for production of steam HP based on average additions to horsepower per year plus capital 
costs from von Tunzelmann, Steam Power and nominal GDP estimates from Deane and Cole, 
British Economic Growth, p.166. 
Railways: growth of capital stock from Feinstein, "National Statistics," p. 448; TFP growth is 
average rate for 1840-60 from Hawke, Railways, p. 302; output and income shares based on 
gross and net earnings in Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, pp. 545-6 and national 
income in Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth p. 166 for period mid-point. 
Labor force growth from Wrigley et al., English Population History, pp. 614-5 based on 
English population aged 15-64. 
  23Table 4. Contributions to Labor Productivity Growth in US Private Non-Farm 
Domestic Economy, 1899-1929 (% per year) 
 
 
Capital Deepening  0.34 
      Electrical Capital  0.24 
      Other  0.10 
  
Total Factor Productivity  1.65 
      Electrical Sector  0.06 
      Electrical Capital Spillovers  0.24 
      Other  1.35 
  
Labor Quality  0.16 
  
Labor Productivity Growth  2.15 
  
Memorandum Items   
      Electrical Capital Income Share (%)  3.0 
      Electrical Sector Output Share (%)  1.7 
 
Sources: aggregate economy data from Kendrick, Productivity Trends, pp. 338-9; growth rate 
of electrical capital goods in use proxied by growth of horsepower in electric drive in 
manufacturing in Devine, "From Shafts," p.351; electrical sector comprises electrical 
machinery and electric utilities for which capital stock growth and TFP growth are from 
Kendrick, Productivity Trends, p.475, 590-1; electrical capital spillovers based on David and 
Wright, "Early Twentieth Century," p.41, see text; electrical capital goods income share 
based on Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Non-Residential Business Capital, p. 158 and 
Gould, Output, p.28, 61, 65; electrical sector output share derived from Fabricant, Output, pp. 
628-9 and Gould, Output p. 28, 47, 163. 
  24Table 5.  Modernized Sector Capital Stock, 1780 and 1860. (£mn, 1851-60 prices) 
 
 
 1780  1860 
    
Cotton Textiles    1.9    46 
Woolen Textiles    7.4    13 
Iron    1.1    44 
Canals  12    37 
Ships  14    65 
Railways    0  253 
    
Total 36.4  458 
 
Sources: 
1780: cotton textiles from Chapman and Butt, "Cotton Industry," p. 109; woolen textiles from 
Jenkins, "Wool Textile Industry," p. 134; iron based on cumulated investment since 1750 
from Davies and Pollard "Iron Industry," p. 102; canals based on Feinstein, "Capital 
Formation," p. 42, adjusted to 1780 using Ginarlis and Pollard, "Roads," p. 217; ships from 
Feinstein, "National Statistics," p. 450. 
1860: cotton and woolen textiles from Feinstein, "Capital Formation," p. 53; iron based on 
cumulated investment from Davies and Pollard, "Iron Industry," p. 102; canals from 
Feinstein, "Capital Formation," p. 42, ships from Feinstein, "National Statistics," p. 450; 
railways from Feinstein, "National Statistics," p. 448. 
Where required, estimates in nominal prices deflated using capital goods price index from 
Feinstein, "Capital Formation," p. 38. 
 
  25Table 6.  Contributions to British Labor Productivity Growth, 1780-1860 (% per year) 
 
 
Capital Deepening  0.22 
   Modernized Sectors  0.12 
   Other  0.10 
  
Total Factor Productivity  0.56 
   Modernized Sectors  0.34 
   Other  0.22 
  
Labor Productivity Growth  0.78 
  
Memorandum Items   
   Labor Force Growth  1.22 
   Capital Income Share (%)  40 
       Modernized    5.9 
 
Sources: 
Total capital stock growth from Feinstein, "National Statistics," p.448; modernized sector 
capital stock from Table 3, labor force growth from Table 2. 
TFP growth using output growth as in Crafts, "Exogenous or Endogenous Growth," p.752; 
modernized sector TFP growth from Harley, "Reassessing," p.184. 
  26References 
 
Antras, P. and H-J. Voth. "Productivity Growth during the English Industrial Revolution: a  
     Dual Approach."  Mimeo, MIT, 2000. 
 
Barro, R. J. "Notes on Growth Accounting." Journal of Economic Growth 4 (1999): 119-37. 
 
Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin. Economic Growth. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995. 
 
Berg, M. and P. Hudson. "Rehabilitating the Industrial Revolution." Economic History  
     Review 45 (1992): 24-50. 
 
Blaug, M. "The Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry during the  
     Nineteenth Century." Economic History Review 13 (1961): 358-81. 
 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. Fixed Nonresidential Business Capital in the United States,  
     1925-1973. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974. 
 
Chapman, S. D. "The Cost of Power in the Industrial Revolution in Britain: the Case of the  
     Textile Industry." Midland History 1 (1971): 1-23. 
 
Chapman, S. D. and J. Butt. "The Cotton Industry, 1775-1856."  In Studies in Capital  
     Formation  in the United Kingdom, 1750-1920, edited by C. H. Feinstein and S. Pollard.   
     Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988 
 
Crafts, N. F. R. "English Economic Growth in the Eighteenth Century: a Re-Examination of  
     Deane and Cole's Estimates." Economic History Review 29 (1976): 226-35. 
 
Crafts, N. F. R. "National Income Estimates and the British Standard of Living Debate: a Re- 
     appraisal of 1801-31." Explorations in Economic History, 17 (1980):176-88. 
 
Crafts, N. F. R. British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution. Oxford: 
     Clarendon Press, 1985. 
 
Crafts, N. F. R. "Exogenous or Endogenous Growth? The Industrial Revolution  
     Reconsidered." Journal of Economic History, 55 (1995): 745-72. 
 
Crafts, N. F. R. and C. K. Harley. "Output Growth and the Industrial Revolution: A  
     Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View." Economic History Review 45 (1992): 703-30. 
 
Crafts, N. F. R. and T. C. Mills. "Endogenous Innovation, Trend Growth, and the British  
     Industrial Revolution: Reply to Greasley and Oxley." Journal of Economic History 57   
     (1997): 950-56. 
 
Crafts, N. F. R. and A. J. Venables. "Globalization in History: a Geographical Perspective."  
     CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3079, 2001. 
 
David, P. A. "Computer and Dynamo: the Modern Productivity paradox in a Not-Too-Distant  
     Mirror." In Technology and Productivity: the Challenge for Economic Policy. Paris:  
  27     OECD, 1991. 
 
David, P. A. and G. Wright. "Early Twentieth Century Productivity Growth Dynamics: an  
     Inquiry into the Economic History of 'Our Ignorance'." University of Oxford Discussion  
     Papers in Economic History No. 33. 
 
Davies, R. S. W. and S. Pollard. "The Iron Industry, 1750-1850."  In Studies in Capital  
     Formation in the United Kingdom, 1750-1920, edited by C. H. Feinstein and S. Pollard  
     Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
 
Deane, P. and W. A. Cole. British Economic Growth, 1688-1959. Cambridge: Cambridge  
     University Press, 1962. 
 
Devine, W. "From Shafts to Wires: Historical Perspective on Electrification." Journal of  
     Economic History 43 (1983): 347-72. 
 
Fabricant, S. The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899-1937. New York: National  
     Bureau of Economic Research, 1940. 
 
Feinstein, C. H. "Capital Formation in Great Britain."  In Cambridge Economic History of  
     Europe, vol 7, part 1, edited by P. Mathias and M. M. Postan. Cambridge: Cambridge  
     University Press, 1978. 
 
Feinstein, C. H. "Capital Accumulation and the Industrial Revolution."  In The Economic  
     History of Britain Since 1700, vol. 1, edited by R. Floud and D. McCloskey. Cambridge:  
     Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
 
Feinstein, C. H. "National Statistics, 1760-1920."  In Studies in Capital Formation in the  
     United Kingdom, 1750-1920, edited by C. H. Feinstein and S. Pollard. Oxford: Clarendon  
     Press, 1988. 
 
Fishlow, A. American Railroads and the Transformation of the Ante-Bellum Economy.  
     Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. 
 
Fogel, R. W. Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History.  
     Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964. 
 
Fogel, R. W. "Notes on the Social Saving Controversy." Journal of Economic History 39  
     (1979): 1-54 
 
Foreman-Peck, J. "Railways and Late Victorian Economic Growth." In New Perspectives on  
     the Victorian Economy, edited by J. Foreman-Peck. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
     Press, 1991. 
 
Ginarlis, J. and S. Pollard. "Roads and Waterways, 1750-1850."  In Studies in Capital  
     Formation in the United Kingdom, 1750-1920, edited by C. H. Feinstein and S. Pollard. 
     Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
 
Gould, J. M. Output and Productivity in the Electric and Gas Utilities, 1899-1942. New  
  28     York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946. 
 
Greasley, D. and L. Oxley. "Endogenous Growth or 'Big Bang': Two Views of the First  
     Industrial Revolution." Journal of Economic History 57 (1997): 935-49. 
 
Harberger, A. C. "A Vision of the Growth Process". American Economic Review 88 (1998):  
     1-32. 
 
Harley, C. K. "British Industrialization before 1841: Evidence of Slower Growth during the  
     Industrial Revolution." Journal of Economic History 42 (1982): 267-89. 
 
Harley, C. K. "Reassessing the Industrial Revolution: a Macro View."  In The British  
     Industrial Revolution: an Economic Perspective, edited by J. Mokyr. Oxford: Westview  
     Press, 1999. 
 
Harley, C. K. and N. F. R. Crafts. "Simulating the Two Views of the Industrial Revolution."  
     Journal of Economic History 60: 819-41. 
 
Hawke, G. R. Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales, 1840-1870. Oxford:  
     Clarendon Press, 1970. 
 
Helpman, E. (ed.) General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth. MIT Press:  
     Cambridge, Mass.. 
 
Jara-Diaz, S. R. "On the Relation betwen Users' Benefits and the Economic Effects of  
     Transportation Activities." Journal of Regional Science 26 (1986): 379-91. 
 
Jenkins, D. T. "The Wool Textile Industry, 1780-1850."  In Studies in Capital Formation in  
     the United Kingdom, 1750-1920, edited by C. H. Feinstein and S. Pollard. Oxford:  
     Clarendon Press, 1988. 
 
Jorgenson, D. W. and K. J. Stiroh. "Raising the Speed Limit: US Economic Growth in the  
     Information Age." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (2000), 125-211. 
 
Kanefsky, J. W. "The Diffusion of Power Technology in British Industry." Unpublished Ph.  
     D. thesis, University of Exeter, 1979. 
 
Kanefsky, J. W. "Motive Power in British Industry and the Accuracy of the 1870 Factory 
     Return." Economic History Review 32 (1979): 360-75. 
 
Kendrick, J. W. Productivity Trends in the United States. Princeton: Princeton University  
     Press, 1961 
 
Lipsey, R. G., C. Bekar, and K. Carlaw. "What Requires Explanation ?" In General Purpose  
     Technologies and Economic Growth, edited by E. Helpman. MIT Press: Cambridge,  
     Mass.. 
 
McCloskey, D. N. "The Industrial Revolution 1780-1860: a Survey." In The Economic  
     History of Britain Since 1700, vol. 1, edited by R. Floud and D. McCloskey. Cambridge:  
  29     Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
 
Mitch, D. "The Role of Education and Skill in the British Industrial Revolution." In The  
     British Industrial Revolution: An Economic Perspective, edited by J. Mokyr. Oxford:  
     Westview Press. 
 
Mitchell, B. R. British Historical Statistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
 
Mokyr, J. "Editor's Introduction: the New Economic and the Industrial Revolution."  In The  
     British Industrial Revolution: An Economic Perspective, edited by J. Mokyr. Oxford:  
     Westview Press 
 
Musson, A. E. "Industrial Motive Power in the United Kingdom, 1800-1870." Economic  
     History Review 29 (1976): 415-39. 
 
Oliner, S. D. and D. E. Sichel. "The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s: Is Information 
Technology the Story ?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(4) (2000), 3-22. 
 
Oulton, N. "ICT and Productivity Growth in the United Kingdom." Bank of England  
     Discussion Paper No 140, 2001. 
 
Pilat, D. and F. Lee. "Productivity Growth in ICT-Producing and ICT-Using Industries: a  
     Source of Growth Differentials in the OECD?" OECD STI Working Paper forthcoming. 
 
Romer, P. M. "Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth." Journal of Political Economy 95  
     (1986): 1002-37. 
 
Stiroh, K. J. "Information Technology and the US Productivity Revival: What do the Industry  
     Data Say?" Federal Reserve Board of New York Working Paper No. 115. 
 
Temin, P. "Two Views of the British Industrial Revolution." Journal of Economic History 57  
     (1997): 63-82. 
 
US Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President. Washington, DC,  
     2001. 
 
von Tunzelmann, G. N. Steam Power and British Industrialization to 1860. Oxford: 
     Clarendon Press, 1978. 
 
Wrigley, E. A., R. S. Davies, J. E. Oeppen, and R. S. Schofield. English Population History  
     from Family Reconstitution, 1580-1837. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
  30Endnotes 
                                                 
1 This has been set out successively in Crafts, "English Economic Growth", idem, "National Income Estimates", 
Harley, "British Industrialization", Crafts, British Economic Growth, Crafts and Harley, "Output Growth", 
Harley, "Reassessing" and Harley and Crafts, "Simulating".  For dissenting views see Temin, "Two Views", and 
Berg and Hudson, "Rehabilitating". 
 
2 Mokyr, "Editor's Introduction", p. 25. 
 
3 Harley, "Reassessing", p. 184. 
 
4 The best introduction to which is the edited collection of essays in Helpman, General Purpose Technologies. 
 
5 Lipsey et al., "What Requires Explanation?" 
 
6 Von Tunzelmann, Steam Power, p. 149. 
 
7 Hawke, Railways, p. 406; Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth, p. 166. 
 
8 David and Wright, "Early Twentieth Century". 
 
9 Greasley and Oxley, "Endogenous Growth", p. 937. 
 
10 Crafts and Mills, "Endogenous Innovation". 
 
11 Mitch, "Role of Education", p. 255. 
 
12 Barro, "Notes". 
 
13 Feinstein, "Capital Accumulation", p. 142. 
 
14 Jorgenson and Stiroh, "Raising the Speed Limit", Oliner and Sichel, "Resurgence", US Council of Economic 
Advisers, Economic Report. 
 
15 Barro and Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth, ch. 6. 
 
16 Oliner and Sichel, "Resurgence". 
 
17 This is the tradition deriving from Romer, "Increasing Returns". 
 
18 See, for example, Pilat and Lee, "Productivity Growth", and Stiroh, "Information Technology". 
 
19 Fishlow, American Railroads; Fogel, Railroads. 
 
20 Jara-Diaz, "On the Relation". 
 
21 Fogel, "Notes", p. 3. 
 
22 Harberger, "Vision". 
 
23 Foreman-Peck, "Railways"; Hawke, Railways. 
 
24 Kanefsky, "Diffusion", p. 338; idem, "Motive Power", p. 373. 
 
25 Idem, "Diffusion", pp. 145-6. 
 
26 Ibid., pp. 175-6. 
 
27 von Tunzelmann, Steam Power, pp. 72-4. 
  31                                                                                                                                                        
 
28 Ibid., p.150. 
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table 3 and ICT in Table 2.  A crude estimate of its impact can be obtained by comparing the rates of price 
decrease for computers and software according to the national accounts of the USA and of the UK, a country 
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percentage points per year and the own TFP contribution by a similar amount.  If a correction of this magnitude 
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